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Abstract
We propose building an integrated agent-based simulation environment to find the
effective security profile within the budget considerations. The key ideas involved are:
dynamic firm profile; behavior based dynamic attacker profile generator; leaming-based
IDS, and an evolutionary search via genetic algorithms for the effective security profile.
The significant contribution of this work is that it integrates the management and
computer science concepts to build a seamless interactive simulation environment in
order to address an important problem in the field of information security.
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1. Introduction
Information warfare has been a major threat to business enterprises and it assumes special
significance in the post 9111 world. In today's highly competitive environment the
success of a firm is dependent on how well the finn manages its information resources.
Business managers have to make complex decisions regarding the security of these
resources while operating under budget constraints. Thus, information security has
become a critical issue to the success and stability of any business enterprise. Investing
in correct security technologies is crucial to countering the threats from perpetrators,
especially in a dynamic environment where the attackers continuously learn and adapt to
the security technologies and keep devising innovative techniques to breach the finn's

security. Current security research concentrates on providing technical solutions to the
security threats from attackers [2, 17]. This means coming up with a combination of
different security solutions such as flfewalls, IDS, log systems, encryption etc. These
studies address specific security threats and assume certain behaviors of the attackers.
The effectiveness of these solutions reduces once the attackers change their strategies.
Hence, providing security solutions catering to the dynamic nature of the attackers is
critical.
We propose to design a system that provides security solutions for a firm in light of the
dynamic nature of the attacker. Simulations are carried Out in which the attackers attack
the firm. Based upon the vulnerability of the firm, the attackers are successful in
breaching the security and hence in inflicting damages. The vulnerability of the firm
depends on the security solutions that it has chosen to guard itself from the expected
attacks. Successfully tracking the attacks for a given security configuration of the firm
will help in learning more about the finn's preparedness. Analyzing different finn
security solutions in the light of attacks will be a good search tool for coming up with
effective security measures that a firm needs to adopt. This could be a valuable aid in
business decision-making especially given the importance of the problem of information
security and the cost involved.
In order for this tool to be effective, the real world situation needs to be simulated.
Simulation needs to mimic the actual scenarios as much as possible. Unlike the present
studies [2, 17], we propose to enhance the simulations by including the dynamic behavior
of the attackers. In the real world the attacker behavior changes based upon the results
from the previous attacks. This learning aspect on the part of the attackers makes them
more lethal and from the perspective of the firm leads to an unpredictable environment.
Unless the finn becomes more effective in predicting the attacker moves, the losses
would mount.
We propose an integrated simulation framework that can simulate the attacks from a set
of dynamic attackers. The firm is modeled as an entity with a specific set of security
solutions. Attacks are carried out by attackers who learn from the effectiveness of their
past attacks. The system that we are planning incorporates the dynamic behavior of the
attacker by including learning mechanisms ([3], [6], [13], [21]). This simulates the real
world scenario. An intrusion detection system (IDS) screens the attacks so that only the
most lethal ones affect the firm. A popUlation based stochastic guided search algorithm
based on evolutionary principles is used to come up with effective security solutions for
the firm. Multiple security solutions are screened at every time step for their effectiveness
in warding off the attacks. Attackers enhance their strategies based upon the effectiveness
of the attacks at the previous time step. When the simulation ends based upon a user
defined termination criterion, we get multiple solutions thal are effective in guarding the
finn from the attackers.
The user can define the "effectiveness" of the security solutions. This could be the ability
of the security solution to protect against the vulnerabilities, or simply the cost of the
security components thal the firm chooses. This modular object oriented framework can
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be easily extended to incorporate any definition for the effectiveness of the firm's
security solutions as long as it can be numerically evaluated.
Inclusion of the IDS in the proposed integrated framework leads to the choice of security
components that help the firm withstand the toughest attacks. An IDS is a default and
relatively common security solution adopted by most finns in the real world. The reasons
[25J for this being:
• An IDS prevents problems by increasing the perceived risk of discovery and
punishment of attackers
• It can detect attacks and other security violations that are not prevented by other
security measures
• It can document the existing threat to an organization
• It acts as quality control for security design and administration, especially of large
and complex enterprises
• It provides useful information about intrusions that do take place, allowing improved
diagnosis, recovery, and correction of causative factors.
The current architecture cail also be extended to the defense environment, where the
behavior profiles of the enemy can be analyzed to develop effective defense mechanisms.
Thus in the following pages we present a framework that includes behavior based model
for .of dynamic attackers, an environment that closely mimics the real world scenario for
the simulation of attacks and an easily extensible search procedure that comes up with
effective security solutions for a finn. This could be a valuable business tool for the
managers for making crucial decisions about the choice of security solutions or any
enterprise.

2. Problem Statement
The research problem is to develop a system that will aid business decision makers in
generating effective security solutions for any business enterprise in light of the dynamic
nature of the attacker. This system comprises a simulation environment that mimics the
real world as much as possible. Simulations are carried out to evaluate the effectiveness
of the different security profiles in light of attackers who change their strategies
dynamically. The presence of dynamic attackers who learn from the effectiveness of their
previous attacks and the IDS makes this integrated framework realistic. Security solutions
are evaluated based on user defined criteria such as their cost, budget constraints of the
finn, effectiveness of the solutions in withstanding various attacks and any other user
defined criteria.

3. Research Direction
The main thrust of our research is in two directions:
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1. Design of a framework that helps generate effective security profiles for the firms in
the presence of dynamic attackers. This entails research in the following areas:
•
•
•
•

Representation of a finn along with its security components
Modeling the attacker who can change attack strategies dynamically along the
course of the simulation
Inclusion of an Intrusion Detection System that is representative of a security
component of the organization
Developing a simulation that provides for the efficient interaction of the various
components

2. Design and conduct experiments to simulate and validate the proposed architecture and
illustrate its efficacy. The interaction and dynamic adaptability of the various components
will be studied. Experiments will be designed for analyzing the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•

The efficacy of the representation of the organization in mimicking the real world
Improvement in the effectiveness of the security solutions over time in light of
changing attacks
Whether the components chosen satisfy the user defined optimality criteria
Effect of attacker learning mechanism on the security solutions generated
Efficiency of the learning process of the Intrusion Detection System
Most effective choice of security components to overcome vulnerabilities of the
organizations

4. Related Work
Some of the related issues addressed in past and present infonnation security research
have focused on
• Generating security policy assuming static perpetrator behavior
• Stochastic simulation of attacks
• Psychometrics - modeling psychological aspects of a attacker
• Learning-based intrusion detection systems
Rees et al [17] have developed a Policy Framework for Interpreting Risk in eCommerce
Security (PFIRES). This work proposes a life-cycle based approach to dynamically
develop security policies. The key objective of their research is to provide information
security professionals and top management a framework through which usable security
slrategy and policy for e-commerce applications can be created and maintained in line
with the standard information technology lifecycle.
Soumyo and Konda [15] have developed a model to evaluate trade-offs between cost of
defense mechanisms for networked systems and the resulting expected survivability after
a network attack. The costs will be those of deploying and maintaining various defense
mechanisms to protecl a system or site against attacks, including the costs of any
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constraints on the system imposed by the defense mechanism. The benefits will be those
of increased survivability, the ability of systems to recover from attacks, of the system or
site. A primary objective of their research is to develop and apply a reasonably realistic
simulation model that can help systems managers and chief information officers to
understand survivability issues better and evaluate the tradeoffs involved in decisions
about network systems design, including their defense mechanisms.
The above research studies assume static attacker behavior and ignore learning on the
part of both attackers and victims. Presumably there is a continuous cycle of increasing
sophistication on both sides, and this is what our approach is aiming at.
Attacker behavior has been studied through analysis of security incidents on the Internet.
Attackers have been classified into various groups such as attackers, spies, terrorists,
corporate raiders, professional criminals and vandals depending on what their intention is
for breaking into a computer or a computer network [11].
The Physical Conditions, Emotional State, Cognitive Capabilities and Social Status
(PEeS) architecture proposed by Schmidt [18] is intended to support the design process
of agent-based simulation models. Individual human behavior and decision making,
interaction between individuals, as well as interactions of individuals with their
environment form the crux of this approach. This reference model provides a concept for
the construction of agents, a communication infrastructure, an environment component
and domain independent model architecture. It proposes a general, methodologically
founded construction scheme which can be applied to various application areas and must
be filled with specific attributes and dynamic behavior.
The learning mechanisms for enhancing the ability of the attackers based upon the
efficiency of the previous attacks can be implemented using any of the machine learning
techniques such as the genetic algorithms [6], classifier systems [13], genetic
programming [3] and neural networks [21].
An exhaustive study about the various categories in which the IDS falls is available in the
literature [25]. This was done to enable us to choose the category best suited for the
current work.

The concept behind Intrusion Detection Systems [25] is to inspect all network activity
(both inbound and outbound) and identify suspicious patterns that could be evidence of a
network or system attack. The two approaches to develop IDS are knowledge based and
behavior based approach. These approaches have been analyzed and their relative merits
and demerits are compared (Table I) to choose the one appropriate to our requirements.
The location of where the IDS is deployed affects the nature of the attacks it can detect.
IDS can be installed on the network, on a specific host, or an application within a host as
represented in Table2.
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Knowledge Based
Approach

Behavior Based
Approach

Definition
-contains
information about
specific attacks and
vulnerabilities and
looks for attempts to
exploit these
vulnerabilities.
When such an
attempt is detected,
an alarm is
triggered. Accuracy
depends on the
regular update of
knowledge about
attacks.

Advantal!es
-the potential for very low
false alarm rates
-contextual analysis
proposed by the intrusion
detection system is detailed,
making it easier to take
preventive or corrective
action.

Disadvantal!es
-Maintenance of the
knowledge base of the
intrusion detection system
and maintaining it up to
date
-Knowledge about attacks
is much focused causing it
to be closely tied to an
environment.
-Detection of insider
attacks is difficult

Nonnal or expected
behavior extracted
from reference
infonnation is
compared with the
current activity, any
deviation observed,
is detected as an
intrusion.

-can detect attempts to
exploit new and unforeseen
vulnerabilities and contribute
to the automatic discovery of
new attacks.
-do not face the
generalization issue.
-They help detect abuse of
privi leges types of attacks
that do not actually involve
exploiting any technological
vulnerabili ty.

-high false alarm rate
- periodic online retraining
of the behavior profile is
required which results in
either in unavailability of
the intrusion detection
system or in additional
false alarms.

Table 1: Categorization based on Approach [25]
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Type of IDS

Definition

Advantages

Disadvantages

Network
Based IDS

-located on the segment
being monitored
promiscuously examining
every packet on the
network.
-run as an application on a
network-connected host.

-straightforward to
implement and deploy.

- a single sniffer cannot
be relied upon to monitor
an entire subnet.
-easy target for attacks
such as DoS.
-closely tied to the
operating system.
-No protection against
network-layer DDS
attacks (SYN flooding,
Din£)
-hard to manage nnd
deploy.
-one is required for each
type of critical network
application in the
enterprise.

Host Based
IDS

Application
Based IDS

-ability to detect
violation of security
policy by an insider.
-ideal for high
availability servers.

-operate at the Application -defend against
layer and are tailored to
sophisticated attacks
that go undetected by
monitor specific
applications for suspicious both the network and
user patterns and
host based intrusion
application log messages.
detection systems.

Table2: Categorization Based on Location of IDS [25]

5. Proposed Architecture
The proposed Architecture consists of the following components:
Firm
Intrusion Detection System
Attackers
Firms and attackers interact with each other, with firms trying to protect their resources,
and malicious agents or attackers trying to breach the security. Firms try to face the
attacks by choosing various security solutions. The overall view of the interrelationships
between the firm, the attackers and the security solutions is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Integrated Agent-based Architecture for
Effective Security Profile Generation
Firms are defined as the entities that own the infon:nation systems and reap the benefits of
these resources through more effective and efficient ffi3?agernent and operation of their
primary business activities [2]. Firms seek to harvest these benefits while trying to protect
their resources from external malicious agents. The infoirnation system resources of firms
are classified into four categories, namely: network resources, operating systems,
databases, and applications [22]. Each of these resources has vulnerabilities associated
with it.
Vulnerability as defined by Microsof[ Security Research Centre is "a security exposure
that results from a product flaw, and which the maker of the product should fix".
Exploiting of these vulnerabilities causes loss to the firm. Firms attempt to minimize their
losses from damage or loss to their information resources by investing in security
solutions while operating under budget constraints.

To exploit the vulnerabilities certain resources are required. These resources may be
classified into two broad categories, financial resources and technical resources. Financial
resources include monetary resources like assets, cash etc. Technical resources include
skill sets like programming languages known, software available, etc.
For efficient representation of the various components involved in the architecture, we
term the following notation.
Notation}: {) (p,Il,S) denotes all n-bit slfbstriltg S starting from p
Notation2: Max (a,b, ... z) denotes the maximum value amollg a,b, ... z
Information required for the architecture is calegorized and slored in the database using
the relational data model. The various relalions are:
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1. RI' (ISR, ISRType, Vul, VulRep, Loss, RR [j) - This relation shows the associations
between the resources of the firm, their corresponding vulnerabilities, losses that can
be incurred and resources to be possessed to exploit the corresponding vulnerabilities.
ISR denotes the particular information system resource owned by various firms.
ISRType denotes the type of particular information system resource,
Vul is the string denoting the vulnerability associated with the particular ISR and
ISRtype.
VulRep is a bit string representation of Vul. All the vulnerabilities (Vul) associated
with a particular ISR and ISRType are enlisted and a unique bit string VulRep
is assigned to them.
Loss represents the loss incurred by the finn when the vulnerability (Vul) is exploited
(in $).
RR[] is the list of resources that need to be possessed to exploit vulnerability (Vul).
An example tuple of the above relation could be (Network, LAN, "DDDS", 001,
10000$, [Networking Software, .... J)

2. R a (RR, RC) - This relation shows the association between the resource and the cost to
acquire the resource.
RC is the cost of acquiring resource RR.
3. RlComp, VuIRep[j,Cost) - This relation shows the association between the
security components, the vulnerabilities they defend against and the cost of the
component.
Comp denotes the security component such as firewall, IDS, authentication
mechanisms
VulRep[] is a list of bit strings representative of vulnerabilities(Vul).
Cost is the cost of the security component.
The following sections explain each of the components of the proposed architecture.
Section 5.1 explains the design of the firm component, section 5.2 explains the design of
the IDS, section 5.3 explains design of an attacker component. Then section 5.4 explains
the simulation environment and section 5.5 discusses the interaction among the various
components.
5.1. Design of Firm Component
This section presents the representation of a firm in the proposed artificial environment.
Firm is one of the major components of the architecture and each firm is represented as
an agent with a set of profiles denoting the characteristics of the firm. As we move across
generations of a firm, the firm must be able to update the solutions it chooses and be able
to defend against the vulnerabilities it has.
The research questions involved in the firm component are as follows:
1. How to obtain security solutions which provide defense against the vulnerabilities of
various information resources of a firm?

9

2. How the firm learns to update its choice of security components to protect against the
unpredictable attacks it faces?
We propose to solve the above research questions with the following design. The finn is
represented by a set of profiles: IT profile, vulnerability profile, security profile and
exposed risk profile (Figure 2).
~PROFaEGENERATOR

ITPROFaE:
-NETWORK
- OPERATING
SYSTEM
-DATABASE
- APPLICATIONS

VULNERABaTY
PRomE:
-VULNERABILITIES
-ATIACKS

SECURITY
PRomE

>

RISK
PROFaE

._._._._~_._._.
SECURITY
RULE DB

L._ .•••• _._._._ .•.•

Figure 2: Mechanics of Firm Profile Generation
IT profile: IT profile is defined as the representation of information system resources
n
owned by the firm. Finn's IT profile is represented by 4b bit binary string (IP) giving 2
possible combinations of IT resources where

b(O,b,IP) represems the network resource sl/ch as LAN, WAN or MAN
b(b, b, IP) represents [he operating system resOl/rce such as WINDOWS,UNIX
J(2b, b, IP) represents the database resource such as ORACLE,DB2
J(3b. b, IP) represents the applicaTions such as APPLETS. ACTIVEX

Vulllerability Profile: Each of the information system resources of the IT profile has the
associated set of vulnerabilities represented as a vulnerability profile. Vulnerability
profile is represented by a 4p-bit binary string (VP) with each of the p-bit string
representing the vulnerabilities of the corresponding IT resource.
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J (0, p, VP) represents the vulnerabilities ofthe chosen network resource
J (p, p, VP) represents the vulnerabilities o/the chosen operating system
J (2p, p, VP) represents the vulnerabilities o/the chosen database resource
J (3p, p, VP) represents the vulnerabilities o/the chosen application
Let Yn , Yo, Yd, Ya denote the number of vulnerabilities of the type of network, operating
system, database, and application chosen, respectively. The value of p is chosen in such a
way that substrings representing vulnerabilities of various infonnation system resources
are of same size. Each vulnerability is represented by a Jl-bit binary string where
Max (V,z, Vo, Vd, Va)::; 2J1
p= Max (VII' Yo, Vd, Va) f1.

*

Security Profile: Security components are considered external to the firms and are
represented by security rules. Each security rule is represented by 4p bit strings similar to
the fonnat of the vulnerability profile where each Jl-bit string can be used to find (from
Rc) the security component (z) which protects against the respective vulnerability. Each
component has cost (Cz) (from Rc) associated with it, such as cost of installation,
purchase cost.
Each of the security rule SR j has cost costj calculated as the sum of individual
components as shown below
'if component z represented in the security rule
costj=LC jz

Each bit of the security rule can take three values representing high (I), moderate (#), and
low level (0) of security respectively [12].Firrns will select a security rule that matches
their vulnerability profile. It is assumed that the firms tend to provide at least moderate
level of security to their known vulnerabilities.
The security rule is matched to a vulnerability profile under the following condition
'if bit k in the firm vulnerability profile VP and security mle SR j

VP, = SR"}
or
SR ='#,

(1 )

"

Every security rule that satisfies the above condition is eligible to be chosen by the firm,
if the rule satisfies the budget constraint of the firm.
cos t j :'£ budget

(2)

The final security rule adopted by the finn is a function of the strengths of the eligible
security rules. Let, \f' denote the set of all the eligible rules for the firm and s j represent

II

the strength of security rule SR
given by

j.

Then the probability of adopting security rule SR j is

(3)

Where,
SRj

C

'¥

The adopted security rule denoted as security profile (SP) detennines whether firm will
or will not be able to provide security for each of its known vulnerabilities.
Risk Profile: The unprotected vulnerabilities expose the information resources of the

firm to the threats from the malicious agents. This risk is represented through a risk
profile (RP) of the firm and is modeled as 4k/p string. Each character in the string
represents three levels of risk- no risk (l), unknown risk (0) and high risk (-1). Unknown
risk represents the risk created from the unknown vulnerabilities that the firm did not
seek to protect. The exposed risk RP at any bit k of firm is given by

RP,={~

-I

[Vj,jE [Jl(k-I) ...Jl},(VPj =SP)and(SPj ;<#)]
if [Vj,jE [Jl(k-I) .. p},(VPj =Oorl)and(SPj =#)]
[Vj, j E [Jl(k -1)...Jl}, (VPj ;< SPj )and(SPj ;<#)]

Where, 1, 0, and -1 represent no, unknown and high levels of risk, respectively.
5.2. Design of Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
The IDS is one of the security solutions chosen by us for the firm. The dynamic behavior
property of the attacker is to be accounted for in each of the components of the proposed
architecture. Thus behavior based IDS in comparison to knowledge based IDS, which is
based on tracking user behavior appears to be a natural choice. Hence we have decided to
use behavior based approach for the IDS component. As the functionality of IDS
component in our architecture is to detect and prevent as many attacks as possible, the
rate of false alarms cited as the main drawback of behavior-based techniques will not be a
big concern when compared to the accuracy with which behavior based IDS detects
attacks.
In order for the security profile [0 be effective all the attacks be it on the network, host or
at the application layer are to be guarded against. Hence simulation of IDS incorporaling
[he features of the network, host and application based IDS is proposed to be developed.
The issues involved in the design of IDS are as follows:
1. How to design the IDS such that it allows minimum attacks go undetected?
2. How to design the IDS to accommodate the attacks perpetrated by adaptive
attackers?
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We propose to solve the above research questions with a learning-based system for
detecting intrusion presented in Figure 3. The IDS contains a set of post-attack profiles
(Profile DB). The IDS initially is void of any profiles. IDS learns about the attack profiles
based on its interaction with the finns and attackers. It compares current profile with
attack profiles present in Profile DB to say if an attack has actually occurred.
The attacks from the attackers, the results of attacks from firms and the damage caused
are given as input to the detection engine. The detection engine is responsible for
comparing the incoming attacks with the profiles in the profile DB to identify attacks. If
it can detect an attack correctly, the attack is considered as void, otherwise the respective
firm encounters the damage pertaining to the attack. In the latter case, the information
regarding the result from the attack (attack profile) is used by the IDS by adding attack
profile to Profile DB to learn more about the respective attacker. Thus, the learning
engine helps the IDS learn from the dynamic nature of the attacker behavior. The
commercially available IDS' do not take into account the attacker behavior. The presence
of an IDS that dynamically learns from the changing attacker and firm profiles makes this
study a significantly better than the previous ones, aimed at simulating static
firm/attacker behavior to study information security.

Detection Engine

Figure 3: Learning-based System for Detecting Intrusions
The learning engine can be implemented using any of the machine learning techniques
such as the genetic algorithms [6], classifier systems [13], genetic programming [3] and
neural networks [21]. Thus the proposed architecture can integrate the various learning
mechanisms already studied by the other researchers in order to realistically simulate the
firm/attacker behavior. For scalability and configurability we plan to implement a
distributed intrusion detection system based on the cooperation of autonomous agents [I].
5.3. Design of Attacker
An attacker is malicious and tries to learn as much information related to the firm as
possible and tries to attack the firms in innovative ways. His interests in the firm may be
monetary or sentimental. The continuous learning behavior of the attackers is to be
incorporated in our architecture. The various attackers represented as agents can
communicate with each other and exchange information about the firms' resources
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increasing the danger caused to the firm. All of these issues are to be taken care of. The
research issues can be summarized as follows:
Research Questions:
1. How to incorporate the adaptive nature of a real world attacker in the simulated
attacker?
2. How to implement communication mechanism among the various attackers?
3. How do various attackers coordinate to attack a particular firm?
We propose to solve the above research questions with the following design. In the initial
setup, the attackers choose a finn to attack randomly. The perpetrators are represented as
artificial agents and learning mechanisms are implemented to make the agents intelligent
enough to represent a real world attacker. The agents learn by gaining intelligence from
the knowledge bases that contain data from the real world environment. As shown in
Figure 4, the agent-based architecture of an attacker consists of
• Intelligent module
• Interface module
Attack Result Info I Intelligent Module

+ Attack Info

I

ENCODER

L

I

Interface Module

I I

SENDER

Out

I

DECODER

RECENER

I

+

In

Figure 4: Agent Based Architecture of Attacker
Interface module
This module provides the agent interface with the external world with one of the main
functionaliries being transforming messages into the format agreed upon as an interface
between agents and transferring to the other agents. The other functionality is to make the
inverse transformation of the messages received from the external world and handing
over them to intelligent module. This module is further subdivided into Encoder, Sender,
Receiver and Decoder.
Encoder: Encodes the message to be sent to external agent, as defined by the
communication protocol.
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Sender: It sends the message to target agent.
Receiver: It receives the message from an external agent and hands over to the decoder to
process it.
Decoder: It decodes the external message received into the format expected by the
intelligent module.

Intelligent Modnle
The Intelligent Module models the intelligence of adaptive attackers. Intelligence helps
attackers gain utility from every successful attack and exploitation of specific
vulnerabilities in the finns. It also helps attackers choose strategies for attack based on
the success or failure of previous attacks_ Attacker will dynamically adapt to the security
the firms are providing with the help of his intelligence.
Attack Result Info
+ Attack Info

Search Engine

Finn Chosen
(FC)

Firm nfo (PI)

Attack Profile
Generator

Attack Profile Attack Placing
Engine
(AP)

(FI)

._._--- ._._------- ..

" -. _.. ----- _. -----, Attacker Info
,
, (Ar!)
~._----- ---_._----

Finn Info DB
(FIDB)

-_._--- -_.- ... _._--

Attack Result Info

+ Attack Info

I

Ad generator

FI generator
Learning Engine

FIgure 5.. IntellIgent Module
Intelligent Module (Figure 5) comprises of the following four components
• Search Engine
• Attack Profile Generator
• Learning engine
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•

Attack Placing Engine

Search Engine
The basic functionality of Search Engine is to choose a finn to attack. It can be
modeled as an optimization function, which maximizes benefits incurred by the attacker,
has maximum utilization of the attacker resources, or minimizes risks involved. The Firm
Info from Finn Info Database(FIDB) and attacker info (Ad) are inputs to Search Engine,
and its output is finn chosen (Fe).
Attack Profile Generator
From FC given as input from Search Engine to this module, attack profile generator uses
the knowledge of the firm obtained from FIDB along with attacker info (Ad) to generate
attack profile.
Learning Engine
It can be subdivided into two major sub components
• FI generator
• ARI generator
Learning Engine receives attack info and attack result info obtained as feedback from the
attack placing engine after the attack has been placed and updates AI and knowledge
about the target finn. It also receives the attack related infonnation of the attacks
performed by other agents on the target finn and enhances its knowledge about that finn.
FI generator updates FI in FIDB, while ARI generator updates attacker resource info
based on the feedback of the attack.
Attack Placing Engine
This modules places an attack on the FC, detennines the result of the attack, losses to the
firm due to attack, benefits to the attacker, new knowledge of vulnerabilities of the finn.
All the above is given as feedback to learning engine.
The definitions of the infonnation flow parameters in the intelligent module are as
follows:
Firm Info: Firm Info (FI) is representative of knowledge attacker has about the finn.
This includes the knowledge about the IT profile and the vulnerability profile and is
represented as a duple <AlP, AVP>.AIP (AVP) is a 4b (4k)-bit string represented in a
fonnat similar to the IT profile (vulnerability profile) of the finn.
Attack Profile: Attack Profile (AP) is a 4k/J.l bit binary string where the bit values
represent the capability of the atlacker to exploit particular vulnerabilities. It has same
fom13t as the risk profile (RP) of the finn mentioned earlier. The probability of success of
attack perpelIated by any attacker l with profile Ap' on a firm with risk profile RP is
given by,
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zero

fu-

very low -If
low
high

A~k

=0

(All. =1)and(RP. =1)
(AP. -1)and(RP, = 0)
(All. = 1)and(Rp, = -1)

W

where, k represents the bit at which the vulnerability of the firm is exploited
If the attack against a finn is successful, the firm incurs losses associated with the
vulnerabilities that were exploited. The security rule adopted by this firm also has an
associated decrease in strength due to failure in defending firm's resources. However, if
the attack against a chosen firm is unsuccessful, the adopted security rule gains strength.

Attacker Info (ArI): Attacker Info (Arl) is a list of resources the attacker possesses (RR)
to exploit the vulnerabilities of the firm.
Attack Info: Attack Info (AI) is the information of the finn obtained by the attacker after
the attack has taken place. It is represented as a duple <fmn-id, losses-incurred-by-firrn>
finn-id: Each finn in the environment is assigned a unique id, firm-id.
losses-incurred-by-finn: This parameter represents loss incurred by the firm due to the
attack.
Attack Result Info: Attack Result Info (ARl) indicates result of the attack success (1) or
failure (0)_

5.4. Implementation of Attacker Simulator
An attacker has knowledge about the various techniques of placing attacks and tools to
use. He or she is intelligent, and thus capable of inferring from this knowledge improved
attacks. This intelligence and knowledge can be represented as an expert system. Also as
shown above, each of the stages of an attack can be represented as a sequence of steps
which can be mapped into rules of the expert system. Hence, we plan to use the concept
of expert systems to aid in the simulation of an attacker. The following are the research
tasks involved:
1. Obtain the information about various attacks, vulnerabilities of various
components of a system, and various hacking tools available.
2. Provide generic simulation model such that various types of hackers from plain
player to terrorist fall into the same model.
3. Simulation of a hacker to use various hacking tools, which are used by real world
hacker.
4. Find representation for various altacks.
5. Simulation of hacker's intelligence like coming up with new attacks.
6. Can hacker get feedback from the environmem e.g. whether an attack was
successful, and if so to what extent?
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To address the research goal of simulation of an attacker, the pattern of an attacker is to
be identified. The following is the description of a classic pattern of an attacker
Classic Pattern of an attacker
The following flowchart [27] in Figure 6 gives various stages involved in placing an
attack.
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Figure 6: Classic Pattern of an attacker

1. Footprinting:
Footprinting is referred to as the art of gathering target information. The systematic
footprinting helps an attacker to create a complete profile of an organization's security
posture. Using various techniques such as whois, DNS, etc an attacker can identify
critical information.
2. Scanning

i8

With footprinting a list of network IF address ranges, DNS servers and mail servers can
be obtained. To detennine whether these are alive and reachable from the internet,
scanning is done with the help of various tools like ping sweeps and port scans.
3. Enumeration:
This is another infonnation gathering technique, with higher level of intrusiveness.
Enumeration involves direct connections and active queries. Various enumeration
techniques are present based on the operating system being used, which can be identified
from footprinting or scanning.
4. Gaining Access:
Enough data has been gathered by now (based upon the above mentioned strategies), so
the attacker can use various exploits (such as buffer overflows) to access the information
about the target.
5. Escalating privilege:
The attacker tries to escalate his privileges to system level, if only user level access was
obtained before.
6. Covering Tracks:
Once total ownership of the system is gained, the attacker tries to hide this fact from the
system administrators to prevent detection. The attacker clears logs and hides the tools he
uses.
7. Creating Ba~kdoors:
Once the attacker succeeded in obtaining privileged access, he creates trap doors, so that
he can now gain the privileged access whenever he wants to. One way he can do this is
by infecting the start up process.
8. Denial of Service:
If the attacker has been unsuccessful in gammg access to the system by the various
techniques, he can use his exploits by launching a denial of service attack, and thus
disabling the target as a whole.
An attacker tries to gather infonnation initially through the techniques of foot printing,
scanning and enumeration. Once the attacker has got enough information, he tries to gain
access if possible. If this is not possible, he resorts to the attack of a defeated attackerdenial of service. If possible, the attacker escalates his privilege level, covers his tracks
and creates backdoors. Once the backdoors are created, he can now gain access
frequemly.
Each of the stages in [he classic pattern of an attacker can be represented as a sequence of
steps to be followed to achieve [he desired effect. As an illustration, the representation of
the stage of foot printing as sequence of steps is given below.
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Step 1: Registrar information, associated whois servers information and a listing of
potential domains that match the target is obtained by placing a query to the
whois.crsnic.net server. The query can be placed by using the command whois.
$ whois "Johnson." @whois.crsnic.net
Step 2: Once the registrar is identified, a query to search the specific registrar for all
instances of the entity name is placed. The different domains associated with the name
specified in the query will be listed.
Step 3: Domain names are selected based on the information the hacker has about the
organization's type of business (e.g. if organization is Acme Networks then acme.net is
selected as the domain name). A domain query is placed to get the following information:
a. Domain Name;
b. Administrative Contact;
c. When the record was created and updated;
d. Primary and secondary DNS servers.
The administrative contact may give information about the person responsible for the
internet connection or firewall.
The record creation and modification dates indicate the accuracy of the infonnation.
Step 4: Once the associated domains are identified, a query to the DNS is placed which
could cause the disclosure of internal host names and IP addresses to the attacker. This
query can be placed using tools like nslookup. The knowledge of internal IP addresses is
equivalent to having a complete profile of the organizations internal network.
Step 5: Once the potential networks have been identified, tools like traceroute can be
used to identify the network topology, access control devices (such as firewall), and
potential access paths into the networks.
Approach for Solving Research Issues
We plan to answer the above research issues involved
simulator as below:

III

implementation of attacker

J. Building knowledge base

Various books and online resources give information about currently used hacking tools,
various well known attacks, and vulnerabilities of various components of a system
(network, OS, database, or application).
Different types of altacks are:
1. Denial of Service
An attack that targels resources within the network, with the intention of reserving
resource and keeping legitimate users from gaining access.
2. Virusrrrojan HorseslWonns
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A virus is malicious code that can plant itself into operating systems and
programs and modify them. A Trojan horse is a virus that has been hidden inside
of legitimate software.
3. Distributed Denial of Service
It is coordinated attack where armies of zombie [37] machines are employed and
controlled by a single master to overwhelm the resources of victims with floods of
packets.
4. IP Spoofing
IP spoofing is accomplished when an outside hacker uses a discovered IP address
to gain access to the trusted environments.
5. Replay Attacks
Replay attacks occur when a hacker intercepts a communication between two
parties and replays the message.
6. DNS attacks
DNS attacks targets resources within the network with the intention of reserving
resource and keeping legitimate users from gaining access.
7. Web Defacement
Such attacks entail on changing the content on web page subtly, thus disseminating
false infonnatioll.
The various hacking tools available as listed in [30, 31], are:
1. Smurf
Smurf tool is used to cause Denial of Service attacks using ICMP directed broadcast
messages.
2. fping
fping is a ping(l) like program which uses the Internet Control Message Protocol
(lCMP) echo request to determine if a host is up.
3. udpscan
This tool is used to identify open UDP ports by sending a bogus UDP packet then
waiting for an ICMP message of "PORT UNREACHABLE".
4. nslookup
Given an ip address, this tool gives the name of the machine, by sending DNS q.
5. whois
Given a domain name, this tool provides links to all the sites which have the given
domain name as the substring in the web link.

6.
Generic Simulation model
Hacker's effectiveness depends, among others, on the pool of resources at hislher
disposal [35].We propose to develop a model which takes the resource level as a
parameter, thus providing generic simulation model.
7.
Usage of hacking Tools
The various hacking tools will be represented as a set of IF - THEN rules in the
knowledge base. The rules also specify the resultant output obtained after using the tool.
8.

Representation of attacks
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Every attack has a well-defined sequence of steps to be followed. Each of the steps is
represented as IF-THEN rules in the knowledge base.

9.
Modeling of hacker's intelligence
The inference engine finds out new combinations of attacks and adds new sets of rules to
its knowledge base based on the feedback (success or failure) of an attack.
Tools to be Used
There are various freeware tools [38] that can be used to develop expert systems such as:
1. BABYLON: This is a modular, configurable, hybrid environment for developing
expert systems. It provides the following knowledge representation formalisms: frames,
mles, logic (prolog) and constraints. It requires Common Lisp.
2. ES: The ES Expert system development tool supports backward/forward chaining, and
fuzzy set relations.
3. GEST (Generic Expert System Tool): This shell can be used in a variety of problem
domains and supports backward and forward chaining. Its knowledge representation
schemes include frames, rules and procedures. Support is also present for fuzzy logic and
certainty factor maintenance. It includes blackboard architecture. The user interface
utilizes the Symbolics windowing system and is menu and mouse driven.
4. CLIPS (C Language Integrated Production System): A forward-chaining' rulebased tool written in C by NASA. It can be easily embedded in other applications and
includes an object-oriented language called COOL.
5. FuzzyCLIPS: This version of CLIPS provides handling of fuzzy concepts and
reasoning, in addition to the other CLIPS features.
6. RT-Expert for DOS, Personal Edition: A rule-based system with anows for
integralion of the expert system with C or c++ code.
Among the various tools Clips [29] is the tool chosen. The reasons for choosing CLIPS
are summarized as fonows:
1. Knowledge Representation: CLIPS provides a cohesive tool for handling a wide
variety of knowledge with support for three different programming paradigms: rulebased, object-oriented and procedural. Rule-based programming allows knowledge to be
represented as heuristics, or "rules of thumb," which specify a set of actions to be
perfonned for a given situmion. Object-orienred programming allows complex systems
to be modeled as modular components (which can be easily reused to model other
systems or to create new components). The procedural programming capabilities
provided by CLIPS are similar to capabilities found in languages such as C, Java, Ada,
and LISP.
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Portability: CLIPS is written in C for portability and speed and has been installed on
many different operating systems without code changes. Operating systems on which
CLIPS has been tested include Windows 95/98/NT, MacOS X, and Unix. CLIPS can be
ported to any system, which has an ANSI compliant C or C++ compiler.
IntegrationlExtensibility: CLIPS can be embedded within procedural code, called as a
subroutine, and integrated with languages such as C, Java, FORTRAN and ADA. CLIPS
can be easily extended by a user through the use of several well-defined protocols.
VerificationIValidation: CLIPS includes a number of features to support the verification
and validation of expert systems including support for modular design and partitioning of
a knowledge base, static and dynamic constraint checking of slot values and function
arguments, and semantic analysis of rule patterns to determine if inconsistencies could
prevent a rule from firing or generate an error.
Fully Documented: CLIPS comes with extensive documentation including a Reference
Manual and a User's Guide.
Low Cost: CLIPS is maintained as public domain software.
The disadvantage of CLIPS is that it is less effective for heuristic classification problem
solving than for synthesis because they lack support for backward chaining. Since our
implementation does not involve heuristics, this is of no major concern.
5.5. Design of environment for interaction among agents
The current approach involves an integrated intelligent agent-based learning system [2]
that is used to simulate attacks and evaluate the effectiveness of the security solutions in
preventing these attacks.
This environment is created using the framework of Synthetic Environment for Analysis
and Simulation [26] (SEAS) developed at Krannert Graduate School of Management,
Purdue University. SEAS emulates the US Department of Defense's "War Gaming"
paradigm in business and economic settings. It is the application of computer generated
modeling techniques, hero-to-fore use to create virtual realities to set up virtual
economies. Specifically, SEAS allows for the creation of situation-specific economies
through mathematical rule-sets derived from theoretical and empirical work. The goal is
to permit scale controlled experiments where human and synthetic players can play
together.
5.6. Interaction of the Components
The interaction among the various components of the integrated architecture is as shown
in Figure 7.Attacker module generates the attack profile, based on the attacker's
knowledge about the vulnerabilities of the firm. IDS compares the incoming attack

23

profile with profiles in its profile DB. If IDS matches the profile with any of its profiles,
it recognizes a possible attack, declares the attack result as failure. In the simulation, once
the attack is detected, IDS sends the attack result and attack info as feedback to the
attacker to help him learn about firm.
If IDS does not match current attack profile with anyone of its profiles in profile DB, it
passes the attack profile to attack engine. Attack engine compares current attack profile
with the risk profile input from the target firm. It compares profile parameters of both the
profiles to see if attacker really has knowledge about the vulnerabilities of the firm. If
attack engine identifies that attacker does not have above mentioned knowledge, it sends
the attack result information as failure along with attacker profile as a feedback to the
attacker. Otherwise it calculates and sends the losses incurred along with attack result to
the finn. Finn updates its security components from the information obtained from attack
engine and sends attack profile to IDS, to store the profile in its DB, for further
comparison. The feedback loop as mentioned above continues to improve the attacker's
knowledge of firm and IDS knowledge about the attacker.
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5.6.1. Simulation of Attacks
The attacks have been simulated by starting with the simple case where we assume that
the attacker is static and does not change his behavior based on his learning. In the
proposed architecture we would enhance this simulation to incorporate the learning
capability which makes attacker and attack simulation more practical.
The simulated attacks by attackers pass through the IDS.IDS based on its knowledge
from the user profile database either recognizes the attack, in which case the attack is
considered void, or lets the attack pass through it. If the attack is allowed to pass through
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IDS, based on the knowledge the attacker has about finn's vulnerabilities, various
resources he has, and the effectiveness of the current firm profile the damage caused to
the firm is calculated. Depending on the extent of the damage undergone and its budget
constraints the firm's security profile is enhanced.
5.6.2 Evolutionary Principles for Optimizing Security Profile
The security profile of the firm is evaluated in light of the attacks. The fitness of each of
the finn's security profile is computed based on its effectiveness to withstand an attack.
Genetic algorithms (GA), a stochastic population based search is used to come up with
the effective security profile within the budget considerations.

6. Experiments
The proposed architecture has been partially implemented to include the finn profile
generator, attack simulator and the GA engine for estimating effective security profile.
The following are the proposed experiments:
6.1. Experiment A: Testing the Firm Profile Generation module
Purpose: The purpose of the experiment is to test incorporated learning behavior on the
finn side using genetic algorithms and see if the firm is able to get to an effective
selection of security components.
Method: Finns represented as human agents and attackers represented as artificial agents
are placed in the SEAS environment. Only the static nature of the attackers is simulated.
Several generations are run until an effective finn profile is obtained.
Input Parameters:
1. Information about various properties of organization as
a. Budget of finn
b. Wealth of firm
c. Type of Network
d. Type of OS
e. Type of Database
f. Types of Applications
2. Capabilities of various attackers indicating the types of resources attacker is capable of
attacking.
Output Parameters:
Selection of security components that represents an effective profile for the organization.
Analysis alld Conclusion to be drawn:
The selection of security components is to be done from the real life, without taking the
simulation environment into
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consideration. This is compared with the output obtained from the experiment and based
on this the accuracy of the method
used is estimated.
6.2. Experiment B: Testing the Attacker Simulation Module

Purpose: The purpose of the experiment is to test learning behavior incorporated on the
attacker side. Only the static behavior of firm is simulated.
Method: Attackers represented as artificial agents are placed in the SEAS environment.
The experiment is run for several generations in the sense of genetic algorithms.

Input Parameters:
Values of parameters as represented in the attacker profile are obtained from the real
world and taken as initial data set for the attacker.
Output Parameters:
The attacks which the module generates when run through different generations in the
sense of genetic algorithms are captured.
Analysis and Conclusion to be drawn:
Strength of attacks is compared across generations. We expect to see increasing trend in
the strength.
6.3. Experiment C: Intrusion Detection Module

Purpose: The purpose of the experiment is to test the functionality and learning behavior
of the Intrusion detection component.
Method: Nonnal users and attackers are represented as artificial agents and are placed in
the SEAS environment. The learning behavior of the attackers is also taken into
consideration. The Intrusion Detection component simulated is tested against the artificial
agents.
Input Parameters:
Values of parameters, as represented in the attacker profile, are obtained from the real
world for normal users as well as attackers, and taken as initial data set for the artificial
agents.
Output Parameters:
The behavior of the IDS as it is run through various generations is captured. The number
of false alarms generated is also captured.
Analysis und Conclusion to be drawn:
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We expect to see decreasing trend in number of undetected attacks and the number of
false alarms generated across generations.

6.4. Experiment D: Integrated Framework
Purpose: The purpose of the experiment is to integrate all the components and test the
system as a whole.
Method; Firms represented as human agents, users represented as artificial agents and
the IDS are placed in the SEAS environment. The dynamic nature of the attackers is also
simulated. Several generations are run until an effective firm security profile is obtained.
Input Parameters:
Values of parameters as represented in the firm and attacker profiles are obtained from
the real world and taken as initial data set for the respective profiles.
Output Parameters:
Selection of security components that represents an effective profile for the organization.
Analysis and Conclusion to be drawn;
The selection of security components is also done from the real life, without taking the
simulation environment into consideration. This is compared with the output obtained
from the experiment and based on this the accuracy of the method used is estimated.

7. Conclusions
7.1. Summary of Research Problems and Research Plan
We propose building an Integrated Agent-Based simulation environment to find the
effective security profile within the budget considerations. The key ideas involved are:
dynamic firm profile; behavior based dynamic attacker profile generator; learning-based
IDS, and an evolutionary search via genetic algorithms for the effective security profile.
The significant contribution of this work is that it integrates the management and
computer science concepts to build a seamless interactive simulation environment in
order to address an important problem in the field of information security.
7.2. Significance of the Problem
An easy to use and realistic managerial decision tool to choose the right security profile
within the budget constraints is the need of the hour. We have proposed an outline for the
design of an agent-based architecture with behavioral and information security concepts
as the most natural way of implementing real world ideas in an integrated manner.
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